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I. Introduction: 
 
On April 20th, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico 
experienced a disaster of monumental proportion that reeked havoc on those residing in 
the Louisiana’s Gulf region1.  After a malfunction on the British Petroleum (BP)-operated 
Macondo Prospect, a sudden explosion occurred, killing eleven crewmen.  The blast 
created a leak that began to seep oil from the well into the Gulf of Mexico water.  As 
each day passed, thousands of barrels of oil escaped.  The flowing oil not only threatened 
wetlands, diverse habitats and marine life but it endangered fisheries, shrimpers, local 
industries and the livelihoods of Louisianans.  This catastrophe created social, 
environmental and economic chaos within the Louisiana coasts and communities while it 
quickly became the largest offshore oil spill in United States History.   
In this thesis, I examine these events, specifically through the lens of citizenship 
in order to underline the discourses that arose over what happened, what should be done, 
what was not being done and who was responsible for providing recovery in this crisis.  
In particular, I explore the way these conflicts began to take form between Louisianans, 
BP and the local and federal government.  These disputes involve the questioning of 
rights: what they are and who can access them.  Specifically, I analyze the rights of the 
people, particularly their right to access financial compensation, their rights to have 
protection in the wake of disaster and the right to be provided relief and resources to 
legally compensate them.  These legal rights are entitled, under federal law, to those 
                                                 
1 The state of Louisiana, over the past decade, has been the center of historic environmental disasters.  Not 
only experiencing severe destruction but also controversial debates over how these hazards have been 
handled, documented and increasingly detrimental for the people who reside within its borders.  Louisiana 
is important to study because it has been a region that has faced the continuation of socio-environmental 
problems that inflict on the livelihoods of those in the region.  For these reasons and to focus my 
discussion, I concentrate on Louisiana in this paper while also recognizing that the spill affected other 
states in the Gulf. 
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individuals and businesses who have been hurt by the corporation at fault, BP.   
Exploring these issues of the post-Spill debate can help us understand not only how the 
government must provide protection, safety and recovery but also how Louisianans are 
able to access these rights via the responsibility of BP and the government. 
As a corporation BP has responsibility over the environment in which it operates 
and to the people that live in it. It is important to understand that problems arise when BP 
does not accept responsibility (i.e. not covering economic damages and failing to 
document any faulty business practices involved) (The Times-Picayune, January 10, 
2011).  The issues over responsibility also can be interpreted through the government’s 
response or aid efforts.  These examples can bring into question the responsibility of 
those in authority to be able to protect people.  Expanding on this, BP, and the state and 
federal government’s duty to take responsibility in this situation comes into contention by 
the public and media.  BP takes part in shifting responsibility onto others and using the 
blame-game as a way to transfer responsibility off of them.  These debates over rights 
and responsibilities can begin to shift the focus of these authorities to scapegoating and 
reputation-rebuilding rather than providing relief to the habitats and communities.  We 
can interpret how rights and responsibilities are carried out within the debate. Specifically 
how they are spoken of, argued over and dealt with in the context the oil spill.  
Ultimately, this illuminates how the disputes over rights and responsibilities have become 
crucial to unraveling theses issue embedded into this environmental disaster. 
In the weeks following the spill controversial debate sparked over whether unsafe 
behaviors on the rig, failure to comply with inspections or faulty practices caused the 
explosion (The New York Times, June 14, 2010).  This began a wave of discussions over 
who was accountable for the spill.  This rise in public disputes were interpreted and 
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deciphered through different groups involved.  As BP and state, national and local 
Governments made steps to offer environmental solutions, public concerns were soon 
vocalized in regards to who was responsible for protecting Louisianans in the midst the 
environmental crisis.  In a National response effort, there were several initial steps taken 
to provide aid to the region.  These included resources and assistance supplied by 
governmental forces, federal agencies, BP, the EPA, the Louisiana National Guard and 
local organizations.  Although these efforts seemed unified, they became caught in a web 
of public debate over what could have been done, what recovery efforts were being taken, 
and who was at fault for their actions.  These questions become central to the discussions 
over blaming, the abdication of responsibility and the claiming of rights in the disaster-
relief process.   
 Honing in on these disputes over the past 12 months, since April 20th, 2010, 
outlines how each of these parties perspectives have developed, altered and become 
contradictory to each other.  Alhough there were moments of convergence on addressing 
what the outcomes of the spill were and should be, such as the eventual capping of the 
well, more generally these competing arguments worked in opposition to each other.  
These parties’ perspectives were contradictory to each other in the sense that they all had 
different objectives in the debate.  These competing objectives can show what these 
various parties wanted to gain rather then what would be most important for the residents 
in the gulf.  The people wanted aid, resources and legal justice (which they must make 
claims to do) while BP wanted to rebuild their reputation, shift out of media attention and 
distribute claims so they can begin to focus back on their economic production.  These 
conflicts between each party’s objectives work to severe ties between these groups while 
also negatively impacting these groups ability to coordinate efforts in the relief process. 
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In this thesis I am framing these debates around citizenship to further understand 
how the claiming of responsibility and the adherence of rights becomes worked out 
through this environmental disaster. Citizenship is an important way to think about this 
because it provides a framework to discuss the relationships that exist between those in 
power and those who are bound to them (government and the people who have duties and 
responsibilities to them).  Exploring this debate through the lens of citizenship allows me 
to highlight the integration between victims and those in authority to further drive home 
how this relationship becomes distorted, altered and challenged in the months following 
the spill.  I focus on the public debates that revolve around the issues of who is at fault for 
the spill, what relief efforts are most useful, how financial compensation is being claimed 
and the abdication of responsibility by BP and various branches of government. I explore 
the consequences and effects that the shifting of responsibility has among recovery 
efforts, specifically how parties begin to place blame on others for their failures and lack 
of relief efforts.  I also discuss how the accessibility of rights (in terms of how victims 
can access financial compensation from BP and protection from the government) become 
strained as those in power shifted responsibility. Framing the debate in terms of 
citizenship has allowed me to directly focus on what disputes are being played out; 
particularly through the media, the public, BP as a corporation and the different levels of 
government.  This enables me to focus on the interplay between these groups in how they 
provide rights and adapt to responsibilities.   
The construction of rights and responsibilities means that some will unfortunately 
not be able to conceive or access these.  This is important to understand in my overall 
argument because the Louisiana residents represent those struggling to access financial 
restitution through BP’s compensation fund. The way corporations, authorities, the media 
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and public officials speak about the debate can show how the abandonment of liability 
works to transfer responsibility upon others.  This allows for those to minimize personal 
or corporate scrutiny while failing to address necessary steps to take toward providing 
relief to victims.  The Louisiana people can seem to often disappear as players in the 
debate because the spill itself uprooted the social balance of the communities in the 
damaged regions (they lose a voice in articulating what they want to happen for accessing 
resources and being provided relief).  They become a burden or obstacle to BP that shifts 
time, money and resources to victims and away from the recovery of damaged profits and 
reputations. Unpacking this public debate around the discourse of citizenship highlights 
how these people become less of a concern as more attention is placed on the shifting of 
responsibility, the failures of other groups involved and the restructuring of damaged 
reputations.  Discussing citizenship allows for those to inquire who is getting rights, who 
is to blame and who must take responsibility for the actions prior to and following the 
disaster.   
In short, the oil spill was a destabilizing event that invites sociological inquiry and 
forces a rethinking of the nature of citizenship in the course environmental disasters.   
This environmental crisis has led to conflicting positions on how recovery should be 
handled, how compensation has been allocated and who is accountable for the actions 
taken.  I believe citizenship is a powerful way to frame this environmental disaster debate 
because allows these groups to speak publicly about how accountability, responsibility 
and the claiming of rights should be handled.   
 My analysis is structured as follows.  I analyze the oil spill as discussed in the 
popular press. Specifically I focus on the discourses of taking responsibility and the 
claiming of rights.  These discussions involve the differentiation of motives, the 
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controversy over the accessibility of rights, the variation of discourses of blame and the 
disputes over BP’s compensation processes.   In the first section I explore the different 
frameworks that each different group has developed and interpreted in response to how 
they view the debate.  This will lay the foundation of how tensions exist between these 
groups. Each group begins to argue with others over their actions and failures in 
addressing the ‘right’ relief efforts.  The second section of my analysis will describe how 
these groups begin to take part in blaming. This happens through the shifting of 
responsibility onto other parties by making claims about their actions or objectives.  The 
third section of my analysis documents the development of the BP compensation fund 
that outlines the different requirements and eligibility conditions that victims must meet 
to acquire financial compensation.   
II. Methodology:  
 In developing the different facets of my research, I gathered information from 
documents surrounding the oil spill event that included news articles, recent news 
coverage, governmental websites and public reports. I collected documents dating from 
April 20th, 2010 to April, 2011. I used a combination of governmental and corporate 
reports which I was able to access through a variation of government websites that 
provided me with a non-media based perspective.  These sources were helpful to 
strengthen my understanding of the background of the oil spill.  
 I also focused on gathering a variation of national and local newspapers.  This 
gave me information and data covering a broad story of what was happening within the 
debate and provided me two various perspectives that were important for highlighting 
critical issues.  I used national sources such as Yahoo News and The New York Times to 
gather a broad story of what has happened in the debate. They allowed me to further 
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acquire data on the public, governmental officials, corporate administrators and other 
federal agencies.  This provided me information on the progression of the spill and on the 
main conflicts between BP, the Louisiana State Government and the federal government.  
It also captured the overall story of what issues were embedded in the debate and what 
key parties were doing to resolve or exacerbate these issues.  I also used local papers such 
as The Times-Picayune (this paper covers most of the West coastal region of the Gulf in 
Louisiana) and news from NOLA.com to further balance and capture local arguments in 
the debate.  I chose the local newspaper because it is one of the most well-known and 
documented newspapers within the state of Louisiana.  Investigating this local media 
source allowed me to access a more localized perspective on the spill which highlighted 
local public opinions. It allows me to focus on the responses of those affected by the spill 
as opposed to major governmental players or agencies. They provided me a spectrum of 
local opinions where I was able to select ones that were more revealing of capturing the 
perspectives of the locals (other then just reiterating other news out there).  The diversity 
of local and national viewpoints allowed me to support different claims or statements 
made by the parties involved.  Not only did the news articles give me a timeline of the oil 
spill debate but they gave me access to a variation of political viewpoints, a range of 
public opinions, experiences and topics.  
I was able to gather these national and local news articles based upon different 
criteria I used to select this data.  Some of this criterion includes selecting, collecting and 
targeting articles that included key words or themes that signified important articles, 
paragraphs and reoccurring themes that would be crucial for my research.  I summarized 
the data by documenting different official or public quotations that supported my 
arguments. I did this by capturing the different perspectives that surfaced and used them 
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to make comparisons between these arguments.  I used different criteria to summarize the 
articles that included focusing on key claims, disputes and specific themes that arose 
within the plethora of national and local papers.  Particularly I recognized article titles, 
quotations or different areas of articles that captured any conflict between the victims, 
government officials and BP administrators.  My other criteria for selecting articles 
included pinpointing articles that documented controversies, issues with blaming and 
problems with the compensation fund which would be helpful in using in each section of 
my analysis. Particularly, collecting articles to help describe the different perspectives 
and groups involved in the debate. I sorted and summarized each article by indicating 
what perspective it was taking that could be supported in my thesis. I was able to 
interpret the evidence by delegating what each article was doing to compare, counter and 
articulate the variation of opinions that was present between each party (the victims, BP, 
the federal and the Louisiana State Government). I summarized this evidence by writing 
short paragraphs (documented by interpretations, quotes, etc.) declaring what each article 
did and what opinions were being present amongst the local or national perspective.     
Summarizing my data into topics of framing, blaming and conflicts over the 
compensation process allowed me gather the evidence into a timeline of what happened 
when and how. Using this I formulated the evidence by determining what events took 
place, who were the key players and what disputes were being documented in the papers.  
I used this as a way to exemplify how conflicts in the debate developed, evolved and 
countered each other so I could better interpret this evidence to strengthen my arguments. 
I also interpreted my evidence through quoting different officials, administrators, victims 
and media personnel over different claims and statements that were being said about the 
debate. I used these claims and arguments to develop my argument over rights and 
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responsibilities. I developed an argument using this evidence and information to 
strengthen and support these claims or statements so I could show how specific issues 
become played out through the debate. 
 I focused on the state of Louisiana because it has been the most damaged and 
impacted state within the gulf region.  After recovering from the destruction of Hurricane 
Katrina, this state was again pounded by environmental and yet social catastrophe when 
the oil spill wreaked havoc upon the region.  Focusing on this state allows me to focus on 
the historical significance of environmental disruption that imposes social, legal and 
ethical controversies into the living experiences of these citizens, as Louisiana is a 
harbinger for these occurrences.  This state also can provide a window into understanding 
how reoccurring environmental conflict impacts how we understand and view citizenship 
within these regions. 
III. The Concept of Citizenship 
 Citizenship can be understood through many different lenses leading to disputes 
and disagreements over what it entitles, what rights it entails and how it can be regulated 
structurally within the society.  Citizenship is based on a social contract theory and 
carries with it both rights and responsibilities which entitle a multitude of meaning in and 
among themselves.  Virginia Leary explains this in terms of rights. 
“Citizenship is ‘a bundle of rights — primarily, political participation in the life of the 
community, the right to vote, and the right to receive certain protection from the 
community, as well as obligations’…Viewed from the perspective of a long history of the 
concept of ‘citizenship,’ the concept of ‘human rights’ is relatively new, but it has had 
great rhetorical, political, legal, and ethical impact”.  “These declarations of rights did not 
appear simultaneously by chance. The way to the great declarations of rights had been 
prepared by a long intellectual history…These ringing declarations of rights, however, 
did not truly mean that all people were considered free and equal” (Leary 2000, p. 247).  
 
She argues that citizenship is composed of these rights, which does not entitle  
 
(guarantee) that all individuals will reap the benefits, but these rights are a  
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fundamental requirement for the organization of a society. This exemplifies a  
 
pivotal feature of citizenship that has been instrumental hitherto. This feature is  
 
the relationship that exists between rights and responsibilities that are practiced  
 
through the legislative, judicial and political realm of society.  This forms the  
 
legal foundation of society that allows citizens to receive rights from those in  
 
authority who are responsible for distributing these rights, e.g. political rights to  
 
vote, social rights to a well-being, and legal rights.  
 
Sociologist T.H. Marshall provides perhaps the classic definition of citizenship 
that explains that its development is based on civil, political and finally social rights; 
where social rights are produced through the status of citizenship (Marshall, 1950, p. 
152).  His explanation of citizenship is directed toward those that are protected by a 
governmental power and entitled to civil rights within their inhabitance. Citizenship 
entails membership in a state, collective responsibilities on which stable governance rests 
and the obligation to promote the livelihoods and betterment for those who are entitled 
rights and elected duties under those responsible to provide these entitlements (legally, 
politically, economically and socially) (Marshall, 1950, p. 154) 
Marshall’s definition describes the practice of citizenship itself in terms of how 
people and governments balance rights and responsibilities for the common good of 
society. Thus rather then basing my understanding of citizenship on the practice of rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship, I focus on how of citizenship is grounded in how the 
relationship between the authority and the victims. I also focus on how this relationship is 
played out through the different and conflicting arguments and interpretations over the 
claiming of rights and the shifting of responsibility.  Specifically, how BP and the state 
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and federal government are obligated, through social contract theory and legislation, to 
provide responsibility over the victims and the financial damages they have faced. These 
groups also are responsible for delegating protection, relief and safety to the victims.  The 
relationship between how these victims claim rights and how those in power allocate 
responsibility over these rights is important to understanding what happened in the debate 
(using citizenship can help show this).  The disputes between these groups begin to 
revolve around the notion of citizenship itself, meaning the debate is built upon conflicts 
that arise in the practice of citizenship. This includes how blaming, the claiming of rights 
and the abdication of responsibility can be understood through the variation of group 
interactions. Therefore I analyze these conflicts through the discourses around rights, 
responsibilities and the different crucial issues that are embedded in the socio-
environmental debate around what is happening to the victims and also what the 
authorities are doing to ensure their safety (what is not being done, what has been done or 
what has gone wrong).  This contributes to Marshall’s understanding of citizenship 
because it highlights how citizens are being allocated certain social, political and legal 
rights throughout the recovery and financial compensation process.  It also relates to his 
understanding of citizenship because it illustrates how governmental bodies or authorities 
should provide protection or stable governance in which the residing Louisianans can 
recover from the impacts of BP’s negligence.  
Grounding my analysis in citizenship allows me to examine the relationship that 
exists between how BP and the federal and state government claim different 
interpretations of the spill.  This results in these groups taking on different actions. These 
opposing viewpoints can eventually lead these groups to practice blaming against one 
another. They do this to avoid public scrutiny and to displace responsibility onto others as 
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a way to protect themselves for their lack of efforts or indecisiveness in the relief process. 
For example, BP blames other companies for causing the spill and the state government 
blames the federal government for their failure to produce timely and organized response 
efforts (The New York Times, June 26, 2010)2.  Rights and responsibilities become 
important in unpacking these different issues of the debate. Wendy Brown agrees that 
rights are pivotal within our society, particularly in relation to environmental conflicts, 
because without rights then those are more vulnerable to an unequal regulation and 
protection under authority (Brown, 1995, p. 2).  She claims that the protection we have 
from the government or corporations is actually a measure of dependence and an 
agreement to abide by these protector’s rules.   Ultimately, this can repress or constrain 
those who are subjected to the power of these entities.  Rights then become a way for 
individuals to share power through this system while being able to access justice and 
promote equality; although this is usually not the case in reality. Not all individuals are 
able to fully obtain or maintain equality in society or equal access to justice.  I think 
Brown’s interpretation of rights is significantly important to understand why it is 
necessary to examine the interaction of rights and responsibilities in environmental 
disasters. Doing so can provide for a deeper analysis on how the victims can become 
repressed within the debates following the catastrophe and are often neglected or left to 
deal with the damage. 
                                                 
2 See also, Robertson, C. & Lipton, E. (2010, April 30). BP Is Criticized Over Oil Spill, but U.S.  
Missed Chances to Act. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes 
.com/2010/05/01/us/01gulf.html?fta=y and Leonard, A. (2010, May 4). The Gulf oil spill blame game: A 
finger-pointing bonanza: Obama moved too slowly, BP cut corners, regulators slept. Meanwhile, the earth 
moans. Salon Media Group. Retrieved from http://www.salon.com/technology 
/how_the_world_works/2010/05/04/gulf_oil_spill_blame. 
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This framework helps me discover what long-lasting impacts this environmental 
conflict has had on the victim’s ability to recover and what can be acquired from this for 
future disasters or preventative measures that can be taken in regard to who takes 
responsibility for the variation of impacts.  Organizing my research around the disputes 
between the people of Louisiana, federal agencies, governmental bodies and 
corporations, allows me zero in on how Louisiana residents are caught in the middle of 
the disputes between these parties.  They are left to fend for themselves and become 
“moral entrepreneurs, posing questions about the distribution of justice and fairness to the 
ecological and political conundrums of environmental controversy and its solutions” 
(Gunter & Kroll-Smith, 2007, p. 7).  Ultimately, highlighting the awakening of a political 
and social consciousness as “people encounter the duplicity of corporations and 
government agencies” or in other words, the way people’s rights come in opposition to 
how these entities should bind to the promotion of safety, protection and maintenance of 
responsibility over their well-being (Gunter & Kroll-Smith, 2007, p. 7). As moral 
entrepreneurs they are able to establish a consciousness over these issues and can bind 
together in an effort to fight against the corporations and governments. This illustrates 
how the variability of actions, behaviors and opinions of BP and the government effect 
how individuals see themselves as against these entities, instead of working with them. 
They can disappear from the debate itself, as the line between responsibility over rights 
and the actual acceptance of responsibility blurs.  Attention is then spent arguing over 
who is responsible for Louisianans’ rights while paradoxically they do not take 
responsibility for producing these rights and ultimately alienate the victims from further 
help.   
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The question arises then, why use the notion of citizenship to frame your project? 
Why not rights or environmental-citizenship? I could use these frameworks to capture 
and explore the debate between BP, Louisianans and local or federal government, but 
they would limit my ability to fully distinguish the way those in authority have shifted 
responsibility.   I would not be able to describe what has plagued the state of Louisiana 
since Hurricane Katrina and the issues that arose through the limited response and failed 
recovery efforts by the Federal Government.  These frameworks would leave out space to 
the critical issues between the claiming of rights and the abdication of responsibility. By 
grounding my thesis around the discourse of rights and responsibilities I can analyze how 
these different groups are speaking of and debating about who is taking responsibility, 
who has not taken responsibility, what should be done for relief or recovery and what is 
the best process to compensate victims. 
There are two further aspects of citizenship that I would like to highlight that are 
central to my argument. First, the new literature on environmental citizenship and what 
this adds to the citizenship discourse.  The second includes the discussion of the notion of 
citizenship in the wake of Hurricane Katrina that has continued to overwhelm the victims 
of the oil spill. The arguments around environmental citizenship within the field of 
political ecology describe how the relationships between political, economic and social 
factors emerge in the context of debates over these impacts (and what is being done about 
these impacts). It also describes environmental controversies that take place where 
unequal costs and benefits arise that reinforce existing inequalities as the result of altered 
power relationships between the exploited population and those in power.  Peluso and 
Watts, explain how violent environments create disorder amongst the people.  This can 
lead to disputes over who is at fault, who obtains responsibility in the situation and how 
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victims are left to deal with the chaos from environmental crises (Peluso & Watts, 2001, 
p. 37).  This argument over environmental disorder is important to understanding in how 
entire populations become alienated from the political or legislative systems that are in 
place to protect them.  Environmental sociologists who wrote The Sociology of Katrina,  
describe how disasters not only cause victims to lose their sense of trust in the 
government but that their rights often seem to dislocate from the bodies of authority 
involved with providing these (Brunsma, Overfelt & Picou, 2010, p. 8).  These arguments 
can begin to describe the incompetence of the government, the absence of authority and 
the inevitability of social disorder as citizenship seems to lose its meaning while the 
government becomes incapable of providing resources as BP becomes unable to allocate 
claims fairly.   
 These frameworks are relevant to my argument because they illustrate the 
growing amount of people who are uprooted in environmental disasters where their 
ability to access legal rights and obtain assistance often becomes difficult.  
Environmental citizenship scholar, Kai Erickson, has described incidences involving 
environmental catastrophes where the community that is harmed begins to deteriorate as 
they lose a sense of ties of rights, protection, stability, safety and solidarity which can 
dissipate from those harmed (Erikson, 1976, p. 154).   As disaster wreaks havoc on 
impacted regions so does the incidence of difficultly victims have in attaining justice.   
The second important aspect of the discourse around citizenship is the way in 
which this has become a consistent and crucial debate that arose out of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina.  Katrina not only impacted the state of Louisiana but it brought with it 
a wave of debates around the concept of citizenship in relation to the response and relief 
efforts guided by the federal government.  Katrina showed that citizenship is important 
 17
because of the way these disputes developed in the months following the hurricane where 
the people struggled to acquire safety, protection and resources they needed to survive 
while the media and public attacked the government for their slow, un-urgent responses. 
 The public debate around Katrina began the significant environmental citizenship debate 
within Louisiana itself by illuminating how the environmental conflict damaged the 
social and economic lives of those affected by this disaster. 
The Hurricane Katrina debate not only brought up the question of citizenship 
within the wake of the disaster but it also paved the road for the recent disputes in 
relation to the oil spill which have showed similar patterns in terms of the lack of 
governmental response, the suffering of the people on the ground and the shifting of 
responsibility away from failed relief efforts.  Margaret Somers recently has reflected 
upon citizenship in the context of Katrina in her book Genealogies of Citizenship where 
she outlines the critical aspects of the Katrina debate (Somers 2008).  Her arguments 
detail how the citizenship of Katrina victims is particularly significant to the way that the 
federal government has handled the disaster which had left thousands stranded, excluded 
and forced to deal with the social destruction around them.  As she argues, 
“The sight of so many forgotten New Orleanians without the resources to evacuate 
the city was but a monumental snapshot in a steady process of increasing social 
exclusion and an eviscerating of the public sphere.  On the surface it began with the 
government’s failure to adequately construct and maintain the city’s levees.  At the 
core, however, it was driven by an ideational assault on the idea of poverty as a 
social problem, and poisoned with the stigmatizing venom of personal blame and 
cries of dependent immorality” (Somers, 2008, p. 11). 
 
She begins to paint the picture of this around the Louisiana victims as she outlines how 
this expendable population has been deemed unworthy for aid and recovery relief within 
the region.  Somers directs us to understanding what she conceives of as citizenship as 
“having the right to have rights- not any single civil, juridical, or even social right, but the 
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primary right of recognition, inclusion, and membership in both political and civil 
society” specifically, where in her discussion of Katrina, “de jure legal citizenship and 
formal nation-state citizenship may have been necessary, but they certainly were not 
sufficient to secure the rights of the abandoned of New Orleans” (Somers, 2008, p. 26). 
 As she portrays what is critical to the debate around citizenship with Katrina, we are able 
to understand the ways in which the victims become more isolated through the process 
and continued conflicts that affect those facing similar dilemmas of the oil spill.   
Somers again uses citizenship as a lens to look at the disaster of Katrina in the way it has 
inflicted those who have suffered. It also can be used to show how the government 
worked to further exacerbate the victims’ inability to access relief, safety and resources. 
 She explains the following, 
“the story of the Katrina crisis is a social parable of citizenship in America today as 
well as for my theoretical account of the conditions that have brought us to today’s 
imperiled state of citizenship and rights more generally…Consider first the government 
reaction to the hurricane.  Thanks to global media exposure, the world was stunned by 
the callous indifference and utter ineptitude of all levels of government.  Few could 
believe that it was exclusively the power of nature that explained the death, dislocation, 
and destruction” (Somer,s 2008, p. 63).   
 
This specifically can highlight that it was not only the destruction of nature that caused 
all the detrimental effects but how the situation was handled, maintained and conceived 
of by the national government.  Their reactions, responses and measures taken to provide 
this only brought more mayhem to Louisiana and the people who were left stranded. 
 Examining the relationship between authorities, who have responsibility over the 
damaged people, and the victims’ situation or struggles themselves, can be critical to 
understanding what challenges are present within the debates over environmental 
conflicts.  Particularly how the debate forms around critical topics that becomes outlined 
through how these groups argue over what needs to be done.  
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Somers is relevant to my argument because she explains that rights were stripped 
away from the people where citizenship was disrupted through the disaster and the lack 
of governmental responsibility. She provides space for examination within the aftermath 
of the disaster and begins to explain how the victims of the hurricane are in fact unique in 
their experience within the disaster relief efforts. Although the oil spill victims are similar 
they are not one and the same as the Katrina victims because their circumstances and 
situations emerge out of different events and also different problems that have arisen 
from these events. Somers is key to my argument over citizenship in the oil spill because 
she sets up the foundation for me to interpret similar experiences of disaster 
complications that victims have faced in the same region as those inflicted by the oil spill. 
        Another way Somers’ argument helps me focus in on the debate of citizenship 
within Katrina is how she speaks about the people who have been left behind.  She paints 
a vivid portrait of the lives of the innocent who have been powerless. These victims are 
vulnerable to governmental flaws that, in this particular case, have brought national 
attention to the crippling impacts felt amongst these populations.  She remarks that,  
“there was the overwhelming presence of those who can only be called the left-
behind, which astonished and horrified even more than government 
ineptitude…People who were kept invisible for so long now took center stage-the 
old, the sick, the poor, the disabled, the very young, the mentally challenged, the 
isolated, the single mothers, the African-Americans- all those who, well before 
Hurricane Katrina, had been the disposable and socially excluded of New 
Orleans…we watched in dismay as more than 55,000 New Orleanians were packed, 
virtually caged, and abandoned in the Superdome and the Convention Center- sites 
of human containment” (Somers 2008, p. 65). 
 
This allows us to question how citizenship is handled in the wake of disasters. These  
 
disasters weigh heavily on the minds of not only the victims but also those who are   
 
responsible for providing them help (and lack thereof).  The interaction of the  
 
government and the victims is a significant facet of this debate.  It depicts how  
 
citizenship is discussed within the disaster, not only Katrina but within the oil spill itself.  
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The oil spill includes issues over governmental faults, the shifting of responsibility and  
 
BP who has continued to disregard victims and exclude some from attaining  
 
compensation, this includes eligibility requirements and conditions.  Somers articulates  
 
this when she states, 
 
“The calamity of Hurricane Katrina was created from the intersection of these two 
phenomena-a multi-tiered government with dysfunctional rescue and emergency 
management capacities collided head-on with the fact of thousands who have been 
left behind, abandoned and helpless in a city that was otherwise evacuated.  Alone, 
either one of these would have been terrible, but would not have amounted to a 
national tragedy of such proportions.  Thousands of people left behind and unable to 
escape the hurricane would always be horrific; but had the city been fully prepared 
and organized to meet just such disasters, local, state, and federal government 
agencies could have prevented New Orleans from turning into a living death-trap” 
(Somers, 2008, p. 65). 
 
The interaction between both the victims’ helpless ability to find safety or protection and 
the government’s failure to have plans or implement these plans at the moment of disaster 
created a wave of chaos.  Somers articulates the way in which citizenship can be used to 
speak or and look at Hurricane Katrina, and just as importantly, I think framing the oil 
spill in the same light can begin to show what is truly going wrong here. It highlights 
what continued faults or contentious issues have come into play with Katrina lurking in 
the shadows. 
  What opened the floodgates to criticism was the utter failure of federal and local 
authorities to do something about the Katrina disaster.  This is key to understanding why 
Louisiana is crucial location to examine the oil spill debate because it is a region heavily 
impacted by this kind of environmental conflict. Like the oil spill, months after the initial 
blowout the lives and stories of those who were impacted seemed to disappear from the 
media and soon became “out of sight, out of mind” individuals.  Once again reversing the 
cycle of those who were seemingly forgotten and helpless to begin with before Hurricane 
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Katrina brought them to the spotlight, even though this attention did not bring with it the 
capabilities to providing them resources or aid that they needed and in fact still need 
(Somers, 2008, p. 65). 
These dilemmas laid out the foundation for how citizenship, as well, became the 
core of the debate over the impacts of the environmental destruction.  Recognizing the 
outcomes and shortcomings of federal and local responses to Katrina can help illuminate 
how this debate as well was framed through the lens of citizenship.  Not only has the oil 
spill exacerbated the impacts that Katrina had, but the historical roots of the debate over 
how rights and responsibilities are produced within this disaster, have increased the 
severity of the debate revolving around citizenship.  One of the most important aspects 
about the Katrina debate is how the reputation of the federal government became 
damaged while an enormous amount of attention was shed on this issue.  Haphazardly, 
the governments focus toward rectifying its reputation and its shift of accountability 
toward their response efforts left the Louisianan’s to deal with the displacement of 
responsibility upon their shoulders.  Understanding how responsibilities are relocated 
within the Katrina debate can help provide insight into how this already-vulnerable 
region is susceptible to the continuation of controversial debates over the practices of 
rights and responsibilities.   
Hurricane Katrina as an event has been haunting the lives of those of Louisianans 
who have fallen victims to the oil spill.  President Obama recently reflected on the five 
year anniversary of Katrina.  An article depicted his speech and explained that, “The 
legacy of Katrina, Mr. Obama said, must be ‘not one of neglect, but of action; not one of 
indifference, but of empathy; not of abandonment, but of a community working together 
to meet shared challenges”.  He concluded his statements by saying, “the second promise 
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I made was that we would stick with our efforts, and stay on BP, until the damage to the 
gulf and to the lives of the people in this region was reversed” (The New York Times, 
2010, August 29).  This statement by Obama connects the progress, or lack there of, 
towards restoration of Katrina and the new implications that the spill has inflicted upon 
this already damaged region.  Obama is talking about citizenship, in the sense that the 
administration will stick to its responsibility in reprimanding BP as the party accountable 
for the spill and its damages.  He is also speaking of citizenship by declaring that 
responsibility is being held to in fact rebuild the lives of those that have been damaged by 
BP.   His declaration revolves around the crucial Katrina disaster while he recognizes that 
we must overcome the oil spill by also dealing with the conflicts that have shadowed over 
the public since the hurricane hit the region years prior. 
IV. Background of the oil spill: 
  As the well exploded, the oil spill began to impact victims economically, 
politically and legally by stripping them of their ability to prosper in the months 
following this disaster.  The Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling an oil well in the 
Macondo prospect, which was intended to be plugged with cement, when a sequence of 
failures took place upon the rig (BBC News, September 9, 2010). This section only 
briefly examines what happened after the leak took place and it describes what was done 
in accordance to providing relief to the gulf region.  One of the first things provided in 
response to the spill was immediate relief and assistance actions by the government, BP, 
the U.S. Coast Guard, environmental organizations and federal agencies.  Most 
importantly, there were several investigations opened up by the federal government in the 
week following the spill (The Heritage Foundation, May 18, 2010).  These investigations 
aimed to, 1] understand matters related to the explosion, 2] reach an independent, 
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science-based understanding of what happened, 3] investigate and prosecute all 
meritorious reports of fraud related to the oil spill and its aftermath, and 4] recommend 
how to prevent—and mitigate the impact of—any future spills that result from offshore 
drilling (Restore the Gulf 2011).  These initial steps taken toward the pursuit of lawsuits 
were key to establishing who was at fault for the spill.   
The government also began to address other key issues.  They placed BP as the 
responsible party for the spill and its impacts, and declared that the spill was ‘of national 
significance’ on April 29th (The New York Times, April 30, 2010).  Due to constant 
controversies over the regulation of oil drilling in the gulf, President Obama declared the 
U.S. would not allow further offshore drilling until the full investigation was conducted 
into whether the spill could have been prevented. The U.S. Department of the Interior 
then imposed a six month offshore drilling moratorium (The New York Times, September 
8, 2010) in weeks following the spill.  The federal government took these steps to hold 
off on any further risks or environmental problems while the investigations were 
underway. The moratorium was eventually lifted by the federal court because it became 
contradictory over its implications on the economy. Other parties also took initiatives 
toward fighting the battle against the oil.  The Task Force in the Gulf coalition was 
developed to further build upon the oil spill response and provide evaluations on the 
natural resource damage in the area.  Other parties that began assistance response efforts 
included the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the Justice Department, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Interior Department 
(RestoretheGulf 2011).  The interaction of these entities provided a wide variety of 
support, documentation and assessment over the impacts of the spill.  Other important 
factors that happened included Thad Allen being named national incident commander of 
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the spill while BP CEO Tony Hayward stepped down in July and collected a $1.8 million 
severance package (Politico, April 12, 2011). Robert Dudley took over Tony Hayward’s 
position because the CEO faced increasing amounts of scrutiny and public attention from 
the spill. 
The state government also took steps toward providing the region with recovery.  
Three weeks before the hazards and pollutants of the oil began to make its way onto the 
shores of the Louisiana, a state of emergency was declared (The New York Times, June 
26, 2010).   As this was done other efforts were further deployed to stop the oil from 
further damaging wetlands, marshes, beaches, properties, industries (fisheries, shrimpers, 
etc), tourism and businesses.  One particularly large scale effort to prevent further oil 
damage was a project initiated through the state government in junction with Louisiana 
Governor Bobby Jindal.  Known as the Sand Berm Project, it was a plan to protect from 
more severe damage consisting of a $360 million dollar budget for the construction of 
several berms along the Louisiana coast (The New York Times, June 26, 2010).  After 
much heated debate and controversy over its projected success, on June 2nd, 2010, the 
White House approved the construction of five sand berms which BP would fund 
(Reuters, June 2, 2010).  As the implementation of this project was underway, the well in 
the gulf was still leaking thousands of barrels of oil.  There were constant efforts being 
deployed to cap the well and different strategies being tested to come up with the most 
beneficial and durable way to stop the leak.  Scientists, engineers and BP administrators 
worked for several months trying to stop the oil from leaking into the gulf.  Evaluation 
studies were done regarding the impact of the spill as other experts worked to cement and 
case the leaking well (BBC News, September 8, 2010).  Eventually the Deep Horizon 
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well was capped on July 15th, 2010 after months of failed attempts by scientists, oil 
experts and BP’s company itself (The New York Times, September 8, 2010).  
Another significant event that took place in the months following the disaster was 
the establishment of the $20 million BP compensation fund.   As one of the most 
important players involved within this debate, BP faced a large amount of attention for 
the impacts that the oil spill has had on the region. The compensation fund outlines what 
requirements are necessary to make a claim and what guidelines allow one to be eligible 
to collect on this claim.  On June 16th, 2010, the Obama Administration and BP elected 
Kenneth Feinberg to lead the compensation process (The Times-Picayune, November 18, 
2010).  He not only processes thousands of claims but he is the administrator of the Gulf 
Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), an independent agency that handles individual and 
business claims against BP (RestoretheGulf 2011).  Feinberg worked directly under BP to 
delegate money toward those that are making claims.  Individuals would accept a final 
payment by releasing, signing or waiving their rights to sue BP and other companies 
involved (The Times-Picayune, September 7, 2010).  Due to stipulation and complaints, 
over time the compensation process developed different types of payments including 
final, interim, emergency and quick ones.  As deadlines have passed for claming 
damages, the compensation process is still going on as funds are being distributed and 
claims are being evaluated.  The compensation requirements and conditions outline how 
disputes arose and how this process made it difficult for those to claim legal rights.   
The events unfolded over the past year have been crucial in understanding the 
instances where opinions and controversies began to ignite.  By this I mean the different 
times when various groups in the debate interpreted and argued over the actions taken by 
other groups.  The projection of events and necessary relief steps taken were called into 
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question by groups who did not agree with these plans or actions. In outlining the 
different players and events that have commenced in the duration of the disaster, I am 
able to show where the basis of blaming, the shifting of responsibility and the claiming of 
rights comes into play through these different conflicts.  The understanding of the 
background can begin to bring up questions over what relief efforts were right or wrong 
and who in fact is pursuing the right objectives to tackling the implications of the oil 
spill.  Delegating these issues will be significant in highlighting the different frameworks 
that develop through each group in the debate.  
V. Analysis  
A. The framing of the debate 
 This section outlines my analysis on each groups framing of the oil spill debate.  
The four groups I have recognized as active players include the residents of Louisiana, 
BP, the national government and the Louisiana State Government.  As destruction 
insinuated so did the dispersal of tension and disputes between these groups as they 
began to react to the spill.  These discussions surrounded issues including the cause of the 
spill, who was at fault for it, how those should proceed with the relief process and how 
the victims should be compensated.  These questions became the core of how each group 
has structured the debate in terms of their opinions, reactions and examination of the 
spill.  Although I am depicting each group in a broad manner, it is wise to keep in mind 
that there are a variety of frameworks within the general outline that I have illustrated.  
Outlining the way they initially framed the debate and how their framework has adapted 
over the duration of the spill will allow me to exhibit the foundation of reactions to the 
disaster.  Documenting how these frameworks have altered is significant in understanding 
how groups have interacted with and influenced how other players were involved.  
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Illustrating the various frameworks of these groups is crucial to understanding how they 
go about displacing responsibility and blame upon each other, which is the second section 
of analysis.   
British Petroleum (BP): 
 The existence of this debate would not be possible without the actions of BP that 
commenced on the day of the explosion.  In the weeks prior to the spill there were 
records released that detailed the complications and rising safety hazards that were 
ensuing on the Deepwater Horizon rig.  An article detailed that,  
“A confidential survey of workers on the Deepwater Horizon in the weeks before the oil 
rig exploded, commissioned by Transocean, showed that many of them were concerned 
about safety practices and feared reprisals if they reported mistakes or others problems.  
In the survey workers said that the company plans were not carried out properly and that 
they ‘often saw unsafe behaviors on the rig’” (The New York Times, September 8, 2010).   
 
These maintenance concerns existing days before the nationally significant spill can point 
out the differing opinions of what or who was at fault.  And more importantly what 
actually went wrong in terms of workers behaviors, the company’s risk-prone strategies 
or equipment incapability’s.  In accordance to these claims over the nature of the spill, 
The Federal Government appointed BP as the responsible party for providing 
compensation and financial restitution to the victims due to their company’s faults (The 
Times-Picayune, January 10, 2011).  As BP become nationally accountable for the event, 
their representatives and company administrators felt differently.  BP began to form 
they’re own interpretations months following the blowout.  BP’s outgoing chief executive 
at the time, Tony Hayward, had initially “blamed Transocean for the accident and the 
failure of the blowout preventer, a valve supposedly able to cut off the flow of oil. But he 
said BP took responsibility for dealing with the immediate problem” (Politico, April 12, 
2011).  BP executives acknowledged that they took responsibility for the clean-up efforts 
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and recovery of the spill as they faced several on-going legal investigations by the 
Federal Government.   
As BP publicly stated their sadness for the communities and environmental 
damage in the Gulf Coast region, they concluded that the tragic accident was something 
they are addressing in their future operations.  In accordance to this BP representatives 
remarked that, 
“We deeply regret this event. We have sought throughout to step up to our 
responsibilities. We are determined to learn the lessons for the future and 
we will be undertaking a broad-scale review to further improve the safety 
of our operations. We will invest whatever it takes to achieve that” 
(Politico, September 8, 2010). 
 
As they admitted their faults for this incident and ensured the American public over 
they’re future regulations, BP still took part in shifting their framing of their participation 
in the debate itself.  As they are faced with the most important role in the debate, in terms 
of providing relief and compensation to victims, they have seemed to take a backseat role 
in accepting accountability for their workers and company’s procedures.  In referencing 
this BP has released a report stating the disaster concludes that decisions were made by 
“multiple companies and work teams” where the accident resulted from “a complex and 
interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, 
operational implementation and team interfaces” (Politico, September 8, 2010).  After 
openly apologizing and informing the public over their failures resulting in the spill, they 
have seemed to also contradict their statements by releasing documentation regarding that 
the spill was not solely under BP’s responsibility.  The variation of opinions between 
their company’s officials and the public statements they have made begin to build the 
foundation for how BP is taking part in blaming other parties.  In doing so they can lift 
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pressure off of them and displace this upon other companies to lessen the severity of 
public scrutiny they receive which has worked to further damage their reputation. 
 As the company faced public, federal and media attacks they were able to 
interpret and make claims over their responsibility for the spill.  As disputes rose, BP was 
able to estimate the impacts and amount of oil that was leaking in the Gulf.  BP 
administrators initially documented that the spill was around 1,000 barrels a day but later 
releasing an internal document showing the analysis of the damage as resulting in a 
worst-case estimate of 100,000 barrels leaking per day (The New York Times, March 25, 
2011).  As their understanding of the severity of the spill developed throughout the 
debate, they were more heavily criticized by groups in opposition to them.  Not only 
originally being the target of hatred and investigations but the changing of their reports 
during the duration of the spill ultimately hurt their reputation and financial loss even 
more.  At the beginning of the disaster BP was unable to predict or even measure the 
amount of damage their actions would cause over the next year.  Not only bringing them 
into a plethora of lawsuits, public outcry and complications over the compensation 
process but instigating an on-going debate over how BP has often failed to take 
responsibility for the impacts that the spill has created. 
In reference to what I stated earlier, BP also found themselves involved in 
disputes regarding their subcontractors who ceiled and cemented the well.  Although 
these companies were working for them BP described them as being part of the problem 
and that the spill could not have occurred without the involvement of these companies’s. 
After a four-month investigation by BP’s Head of Safety and Operations there was a 
report released depicting that BP’s involvement was not in pure solitary form.  Tony 
Hayward stated,  
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“The investigation report provides critical new information on the causes of this 
terrible accident. It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single 
mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton 
and Transocean, were involved” (Politico, September 8, 2010).    
 
The development of these reports were in opposition to what the Federal Government and 
the public believe as being BP’s fault for what practices and maintenance factors could 
have been prevented.  With these contracting companies working in accordance to BP’s 
standards and objectives, it is hard for other parties involved to pinpoint directly who did 
what and who failed to follow procedural protocol standards.  
  Initially barring the brunt of responsible, and rightfully so, BP eventually 
strained from this and opened up their own legal investigations on rig operator 
Transocean, as they also are suing oil services giant Halliburton.  Sueing Transocean for 
$40 billion in damages, BP parties stated they wish to “bring this action to hold 
Transocean accountable for having caused the blowout, explosion, fire, deaths and 
personal injuries, and subsequent oil spill” (Yahoo News, April 21, 2011).  As the course 
of the debate took form, BP had grappled with taking full responsibility for the spill but 
as the year anniversary has passed it seems as if BP has began to view the disaster as less 
of their fault and more of other’s personal errors.   
Federal Government: 
 As BP was the main contributor to the spill, the Federal Governments response 
and their responsibility for providing relief to the victims was not far behind.  The 
government, federal agencies and other U.S. Departments became involved in 
understanding what went wrong in preparation to the spill and should be done to mitigate 
its effects.  The Obama Administration began by stating that BP was the responsible 
party for the cause of the oil spill and they would be held accountable for all financial or 
legal compensation to the environment and lives damaged (The New York Times, June 26, 
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2010).  As the trivial disputes over the response to Hurricane Katrina was still weighing 
on the minds of Louisiana residents, the government felt even more pressure to provide 
assistance to those within the Gulf region.  As initial impacts of the spill remained up in 
the air the government was unaware of the procedures and preventative steps to take to 
protect the region.  This all came into realization several days following the explosion.  It 
was stated in an articles that,  
“On April 29, just after estimates of the size of the spill were increased from 1,000 
barrels a day to 5,000, President Obama announced that the federal government would 
get involved more aggressively in fighting the spill, and Homeland Security Secretary 
Janet Napolitano designated the spill as “of national significance” (The New York Times, 
September 8, 2010).   
 
As the relative size of the spill was analyzed the government became to bring in more 
outside help.  This included several federal agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the 
Navy and other consulting agencies such as the Minerals Management Service and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to provide further assistance and relief 
(The New York Times, April 30, 2010).  But these coordinating efforts did not come for 
days following the explosion at the well.   
As the first couple days came to a close, the public and Louisiana residents 
wondered if a national and multilateral effort would be solicited in response to the 
growing leak and dangerous complications that could arise from that.  The victims were 
not only becoming weary over the level of cooperative forces between the Coast Guard 
and various governmental and non-governmental entities but they began to fear another 
Katrina nightmare of slow responses and false hopes.  It was a whole nine days into the 
spill that the Obama Administration requested the Department of Defense to deploy the 
necessary equipment to fight the extreme depths of the well site (The Heritage 
Foundation, May 18, 2010).  As the government insists that they were coordinating 
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federal resources and national support, officials starkly gave little indication that such 
reinforcements would be available at such a short notice and at that size of scale (The 
New York Times, June 26, 2010).  Even with these flaws and controversy over their 
responses and allocation of resources made available to the victims, President Obama 
ensured that they were handling the spill as best to their ability.  The president pledged 
his commitment to those whose lives were damaged in New Orleans from two 
catastrophic disasters in five years.  He had said, 
 “federal efforts to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina would not waver even as the city 
struggles with the aftermath of the BP oil spill” and he would promise two things.  
“One is that we would see to it that the leak was stopped.  And it has been.  The 
second promise I mad was that we would stick with our efforts, and stay on BP, until 
the damage to the gulf and to the lives of the people in this region was reversed” 
(The New York Times, August 29, 2010). 
 
With Hurricane Katrina weighing in the minds of the victims and in the memories of the 
administration, the federal government understood the severity of their response and 
coordination efforts with other entities.  Their framing of the debate and oil spill itself 
could not be understood without the realization of Katrina’s impacts years previous.  As 
they took actions and prepared for the worse the government was able to adapt to 
misdoings from Katrina and from public outcries over their lack of response in the oil 
spill to further change their stance of the spill.  Ultimately they pursued litigation and 
investigations for the companies involved as well as stepping up national levels of 
assistance to prevent further Gulf damages to the region. 
As the Administration made this a more nationalized effort, they began to hold 
those accountable for their faults and misleading information about what was done to 
cause the explosion.  After initially bringing forward federal investigations towards the 
parties involved the government was able to provide reports detailing the causes.  
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President Obama’s oil spill commission released a report about the decisions made by 
BP, Transocean and Halliburton managers.  In an article is stated that the managers, 
“increased the risk of a blowout’.  Most were made by BP managers, who had the final 
say on the project and who repeatedly chose riskier alternatives at crucial junctures, 
consistently favoring options that saved the company time and money.  The findings 
focus on human errors specific to the Macondo operation.  Had managers made better 
decisions, the commission reports says, they ‘would almost certainly’ have prevented the 
disaster’” (Yahoo News, April 21, 2011).   
 
As the Presidential commission documented the faults of these company’s managers and 
their mishaps leading up to the spill, they also came to the conclusion that they could not 
prove these personal failures.  As the commission presented the data in this manner they 
also changed the way they had portrayed the companies involved.  In conclusion to the 
report, the commission stated,  
“the blowout was not the result of a ‘rogue’ management style at BP.  ‘Rather the 
root causes are systemic’ failures by the entire drilling industry and government 
regulators.”  And that they couldn’t prove BP or its contractors “consciously chose a 
riskier alternative because it would cost the company less money” (Yahoo News, 
April 21, 2011).    
 
The way they framed each company’s involvement had changed over the duration of the 
debate and even with proper evidence toward their failures they finalized that they could 
not prove this. 
  As the federal governments frameworks and interpretations of the spill change 
over time so does the way internal forces (federal) are viewing the efforts by their own 
government.  The differentiation of internal opinions can not only lead to tension between 
federal parties but also in responses to how the spill is handled or observed.  These 
tensions can be explained in the following disagreements over federal intervention.  At 
the time, the Coast Guard Administrator Thad Allen, stated that he  
“would recommend against more federal control over the disaster response” while 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Salazar, suggested that “the 
administration could go further in federalizing the response” (The Hill, May 24, 
2010).   
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These differing statements can alter the behavior and actions that the federal agencies or 
forces plan to take in response to the spill’s relief efforts.  This blurs the lines between 
what political steps should and are being taken. The government is responsible for 
providing safety, aid and protection to the Louisiana residents so any lack of decisiveness 
in relief efforts can shift responsibility onto the shoulders of the public.   
Louisiana State Government: 
 
The state government also took a stance toward their interpretation of the oil spill 
and composed a variety of opinions over what relief efforts were necessary. The 
administration looked for oversight from the federal government on what actions should 
be taken.  Jindal stated, “We kept being assured over and over that they had a plan, that 
there was a detailed plan, that it was coming; we never go that plan” (The New York 
Times, June 25, 2010).  The state administration is also responsible for their own plan in 
coordination with the federal governments because under the law, oil experts say, there 
are “two kinds of governmental plans pertaining to spills, and the state is partly 
responsible for both” (The New York Times, June 25, 2010).  The state was unable to 
follow oil spill procedure which should be outlined in their pre-spill preparation 
documents.  At the time of the spill their plans included pages with blank charts over 
details of supplies and equipment to mitigate oil spill effects.  The oil spill coordinator 
office was responsible for signing off on the contingency plans in adherence to federal, 
state and local officials, but the draft action plan was titled “to be developed” (The New 
York Times, June 25, 2010).  Not only was the state administration not prepared to deal 
with the extent of the oil spill but because of this they targeted other entities for not 
adhering to plans or providing the state with necessary instruction to go about providing 
relief.  They began to interpret the debate in accordance to what they thought about other 
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federal agencies or branches of government should be doing yet they themselves were 
unsure what steps to take.  This begins to set up how they were a main contributor to 
shifting responsibility off of the department and onto others because they were 
unprepared and ill-equipped to handle the spill. 
The state began to frame the debate around other governmental and non-
governmental help but as they were indecisive on what to do they ended up wasting more 
time that could have been dedicated to assisting the victims or preventing further oil 
damage to the shore.  In the occasion of an oil spill disaster, the state and federal laws in 
conjunction together call for a unified command to marshal resources and create daily 
action plans.  The state seemed to stretch away from this plan and begin to develop 
they’re own opinions over what was necessary to protect Louisiana.  The state’s approach 
was divided where some officials worked alongside federal agencies while others, 
including the governor, followed their independent approach.  Jindal praised the building 
of a sand berm project which was not only costly, estimating up to $1 billion, but it raised 
serious concerns from scientists, federal officials and environmentalists.  Jindal 
advocated that the sand berm project was the state’s “necessary defense strategy” and that 
it represented the state’s best hope of protecting the fragile Mississippi Delta and its 
fisheries (The New York Times, May 21, 2010).  The governor’s plan could dissipate in 
months and actually hurt the shore even more but he was too concerned with providing 
urgent relief and a plan that represented that his administration was actually taking 
initiatives to fight this disaster.  Jindal’s go at it alone approach not only hampered the 
national efforts but it broke any ties to providing a unified relief plan.  As many 
governments have been attacked for their lack of response and urgency, he often took his 
urgency too far by deploying a plan that was not studied or proved to be beneficial.  This 
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almost seemed as a response imposed in order to mitigate future scrutiny towards the spill 
and provide weight to their argument that federal agencies were not stepping up to the 
plate like the state government has.  This not only mirrored the controversy that the 
federal government found themselves in during the disaster response to Katrina, but it 
involved the state’s hectic and often chaotic approaches that fell stray behind a unified 
response.  As the state proposed their own preventative strategies they began to attack all 
others who did not follow or agree with their plans.  Being more proactive in their own 
approach began to lay the foundation for how they shifted responsibility off of their 
shoulders and towards other groups.  This will be significant in the way they displaced 
blame onto others for their failure to adhere to necessary relief efforts. 
Residents of Louisiana: 
 The most important group within this debate is the residents themselves who have 
been victimized, vulnerable to further disaster and left stranded to deal with the damages 
imposed on them.  This group is different from the previous three because they are not in 
any way responsible for the recovery efforts or for providing resources to the clean-up 
process.  They do in fact frame the debate differently from all the others as well because 
they are the ones who are reaping the financial damages.  As they grapple with the 
impacts from the disaster, they are able to come up with their own opinions and 
interpretations over who is at fault and what should be done, e.g. in terms of recovery 
efforts and compensation.  As the oil reached wetlands and ruined businesses, the 
residents of Louisiana began to publicly react in different ways.  Initially victims 
responded by saying the oil spill event,  
“should catalyze big changes in the way we power our country and regulate our 
corporations.  But with conservatives and politicians from manufacturing states 
arguing that passing a climate bill would further weaken an already-flailing 
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economy, is a spill of even these epic proportions enough to stave off backlash 
against major environmental legislation?” (The American Prospect, June 15, 2010). 
 
The long-standing oil crisis and lax regulations have benefited the companies at large but 
have worked to decrease safety and health standards that directly hurt those living in the 
gulf.  Louisianans who have felt the consequences of the oil giant’s mistakes and 
agree that regulatory and safety changes are needed to avoid another such tragedy.  
 As this group frames the spill they are able to have a first hand account of the ill 
effects that have deteriorated their state.  Not only have their livelihoods been ripped 
from under their feet but they are unable to receive full financial compensation due to 
BP’s range of requirements and because the victims are still unaware of the future 
damages they will endure.  Personal accounts of the spills impact can be understood 
through the stories and complaints that residents have publicized.  One Louisiana 
individual explained her troubles when she said,  
“I am from Terrebonne Parish in South Louisiana right along the Gulf. The oil spill 
affected us tremendously on every scale. Our main industries that we thrive from are the 
oil industry and the seafood industry. The oil is killing our wetlands and washing into our 
bayous and waterways. This is killing and contaminating our seafood. Almost every 
restaurant in South Louisiana is a seafood restaurant. All of our commercial fisherman, 
shrimpers, crabbers and so on are losing their jobs. The restaurants are closing and many 
jobs are being lost due to no seafood coming in. Now that Obama has shut down deep 
water drilling, many oilfield companies are moving to overseas. Not only are we losing 
jobs in the seafood industry, but we are also losing jobs in the oil industry” (Yahoo News, 
Septembe,11, 2010). 
 
This victims own account of the damages felt in the gulf were only one story of 
thousands of individuals offset by the implications this spill has had on their livelihoods.  
Other individuals commented on how they were “paying the price” for the oil company’s 
mistakes and that through this process they have been “standing in solidarity with the 
people on the coast of Louisiana.”  They want “people and individuals compensated 
fully.  And we also want to clean up the energy supply and the way we live” (The Daily 
Reveille, June 21, 2010).   Their own personal examination of the spill provides them 
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ample amounts of hatred and animosity over the government’s and BP’s responses to 
clean-up.  Other residents have complained that,  
“It could get into the local drainage systems and water systems of local communities 
if it comes inland enough and can begin to cause sickness among people using public 
water systems, as it has among marine life” (New American Media, June 21, 2010).  
 
Louisianan’s are weary over the long term effects that oil might have as a pollutant and 
hazard to their health.  As this spill has personally devastated their lives they have 
developed into a group that is working toward gaining justice.  Having this particular 
point of view allows them to frame certain parties as enemies or those who are creating 
even more trouble for them in the recovery process, e.g. BP’s complicated and 
controversial compensation process that has left thousands without financial restitution.  
This group also is almost seen as less powerful in their fight against BP and sometimes 
governmental forces to obtain the safety, protection and legal compensation in which 
they are obligated to.  This group began to blame others for their lack of responsibility 
and lack of fully compensating the victims involved.  This began to be played out as I 
compare this group with others within the blaming section. 
Tension: 
 The formation into these groups following the spill begins to separate each by 
their various opinions, interpretations and understandings of the spill.  As these groups 
frame the debate within their own context they began to oppose the framings of other 
groups which do not coordinate with what they see as what happened or what should 
happen in relation to the spill.  In accordance to the spill response, these groups begin to 
take actions or employ preventative response efforts that are not agreed upon by all.  
Such as implementing the sand berm project or initiating more response days following 
the disaster.  The groups even argue over who was at fault for the spill in their 
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explanation of what went wrong on the Deepwater Horizon rig.  As these frameworks 
begin to reflect their behaviors and actions then disputes over what is right or wrong 
begin to come into play.  Specifically when opposing groups do not agree with response 
efforts and the actual cause of the explosion, e.g. BP claims it was not entirely their fault 
yet the public does.  As arguments become prevalent and media backlash between these 
groups’ increases then the act of shifting responsibility takes form.  As those become 
more inclined to propose their plans or interpretations of the spill then they are more 
likely to blame others for their inability to accept these claims or agree with the efforts 
being introduced.  When a group is certain of its position in the debate they can start to 
shift blame onto other parties for not accepting this.  Targeting these other groups 
alleviates the media and public scrutiny off their back and onto another party, e.g. BP 
blames other companies for their faults and the state government blames federal agencies 
for their lack of responses.  
These conflicts between groups can lead to what Administrator Mary E. Landry 
of the Coast Guard referred to “as ‘dynamic tension’ among the participants in the spill 
response” (The New York Times, September 8, 2010).  These parties involved were not 
adhering to working as a cohesive unit but they were scattered and opposing each others 
efforts.  This not only began to shift relief efforts away from the victims and 
environmental damage but it gave more attention to these opposing parties.  As they were 
captured in the media for their consistency to blame others they were seemingly focusing 
their attention away from the disaster itself.  As this ‘dynamic tension’ becomes the core 
of these debates, I will use this to outline and describe how the shifting of responsibility 
begins to develop as these groups polarize their framings of the debate and focus on 
minimizing the scrutiny they have obtained in the media. 
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B. Blaming: 
 
 One of the most prominent and encompassing factors within the debate is the 
concept of blaming.  Different parties involved can take part in this by shifting the 
responsibility from themselves onto other parties.  Often the abdication of responsibility 
is an important aspect because many groups fail to take accountability for their own 
actions as well.  Transferring responsibility onto other groups sometimes can result 
because these parties are trying to avoid facing a damaging reputation and criticism by 
the public (I will support this with evidence in the analysis).  Analyzing this variation of 
blame can be helpful in understanding how conflict and controversies began to take form 
and play out as the debate progresses. I have broken down the blaming section by parties 
who have directed or received blame. 
Louisiana State Government: 
There are different kinds of blame that take place amongst the state government.  
This includes blaming towards federal agencies, the federal government and toward BP.  
I will first detail how governmental administrations have been involved with different 
acts of blaming in the Louisiana State Government. Particularly the blame that Governor 
Bobby Jindal has took part in. Jindal becomes an avid player in the blame game by 
making different statements toward other groups. In the first weeks following the spill he 
has been highly involved in shifting responsibility onto other parties and failing to admit 
to his administrations own faults to response efforts.   His administration begins to 
criticize and make claims about the relief efforts by stating (with a statement introduced 
earlier), “We very quickly ran into challenges with the different entities carrying out their 
responsibilities…citing a lack of urgency and decisiveness by the Coast Guard (The New 
York Times, June 6, 2010).  They’re attacks toward the Coast Guard begin to lay the 
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foundation to how the different acts of blaming began to take form.  Placing blame 
towards others can be justifiable in the right sense but this administration has continually 
become active in making judgments about the actions of other entities.  Jindal also joins 
in by debating what needs to be done in response to the disaster that the oil spill has 
caused Louisiana.  He states that these response efforts “demand quick action and quick 
thinking, and especially common sense. We continue to ask the federal government and 
BP to join us in this fight and battle this oil spill with the sense of urgency that the 
protection of our state demands” (The New York Times, June 6), 2010.  Although he is 
not directly blaming anyone yet, he is in fact making statements about what he thinks the 
federal government and BP should be doing to help the state of Louisiana.  He is 
declaring that more strides and efforts must be made toward working with their state in 
these recovery efforts.   
As these pre-blaming statements were made, Jindal begins to shift his perspective 
on the assistance and responses that these groups continue to make. Contradictory to what 
Jindal had previously stated in the media, he now attacks the government for being an 
obstacle to providing aid to the victims.  He insists that federal government ‘get out of the 
way’ and so the state can take matters into their own hands (The New York Times, June 
26, 2010). He not only is urging the government to get out of the states way in 
implementing plans for recovery but he also previously criticized them for their lack of 
help and urgency in their response. His statements are contradictory and he becomes 
publicized for his constant remarks and displacement of blame onto others for their plans 
or lack there of. This begins to show some indecisiveness on his part over what he thinks 
should be done in the response to the spill.  As a state governor, he is focusing more on 
taking sides and forming arguments between critical groups involved in the clean up of 
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the spill.  This works to damage the relationships between these groups that cause further 
animosity towards working together as the abdication of responsibility becomes more 
important then coordinating to help victims. 
As blaming takes form between these groups it becomes a distraction to following 
national and state plans to deal with the event of an oil spill. The state of Louisiana has a 
protocol and set of objectives that should be followed in the event that a disaster of this 
nature should happen.  The following states what should happen when Louisiana is 
involved in a crisis.   
“The state includes a plan that, in conjunction with state and federal laws, outline a 
response plan ‘called a uniform response…state officials, the responsible party and 
federal authorities…are supposed to work together to create day-to-day action 
plans’” (The New York Times, June 26, 2010).    
 
This dictates what should happen and should have happened following the response to 
the oil spill.  This declares that the state government should in fact work with BP and the 
federal government to achieve the best possible outline and plan towards facing the 
disaster.  Instead of adhering to the state plans, Jindal decides to come up with an 
independent way of going about things.  He chooses to blame these groups for what they 
have done or failed to do but he himself where he falls under the same criticism that he is 
placing on others.  Even know Jindal is not abiding by the precedents of his state he in 
fact targets others who have not been able to exceed or meet his standards in providing 
responsibility.  Jindal is using this type of blame as a way to leverage himself above these 
other parties.  This transfers responsibility off of the state’s hands into the hands of these 
other entities.    He digs himself further into a hole with all of the media attention he has 
received.  Making these claims about others opened up the opportunity for those to have 
inquiry on his operations and inability to uphold the responsibility of the state of 
Louisiana.  
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Blaming others begins to show a lack of credibility one’s own ability to provide 
responsibilities to those in need.  Blame is used for the purpose of instigating change and 
displacing accountability onto others.  The state’s use of blame becomes a way to transfer 
responsibility upon others but this opens up the doors to question Louisiana’s ability to 
uphold responsibility.   The following statements represent how Louisiana has come 
under the same criticism that they have place on other.  
 “Interviews with more than two dozen state and federal officials and experts suggest that 
Louisiana…has often disregarded its own plans and experts in favor of large-scale 
proposals tat many say would probably have had limited effectiveness and could have 
even hampered the response.”  “The state’s approach has also at times appeared divided: 
while some state officials work alongside the Coast Guard and BP every day, others, 
including the governor, have championed a go-it alone approach” (The New York Times, 
June 26, 2010).   
 
These statements not only refute and contradict some of the state’s previous claims but it 
also opposes the way in which this administration has sought out to achieve a 
‘streamlined response system’.  Using blame in the debate can further exacerbate the 
severity of disputes between these groups which can lead to the disruption of the practice 
of citizenship.  This means that those who are powerless to the government and 
corporations are actually further excluded from their ability to obtain assistance in the 
way that the victims want.  The more these disputes continue over blame then the less 
likely these discussions will be focusing on rights.  Without the authority working with 
those who ‘need the authority’ then ultimately the duties and obligations that are 
embedded within the notion of citizenship actually become abstract (they fail to exist and 
therefore the practice of citizenship becomes disrupted within the context of this 
conflict). 
 As I have stated earlier, the state administrators of Louisiana shifted toward 
providing their own plans to recovery after conflict erupted between the federal 
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government and U.S. Coast Guard. Their independent plans included the building of the 
sand berm project. This project created controversy over its implementation and 
reliability while it also became initiated more blaming. The state government declared 
that the berms represented the state’s best hope to protect their shores and fisheries. It 
was stated in an article that officials became “frustrated with what they see as 
bureaucratic inaction” and they have stated that “‘they haven’t given us any reason for 
the delay’ Mr. Jindal said” (The New York Times, 2010, May 21).  The state officials 
began to blame the federal government and other officials for not funding and approving 
the plan fast enough. An article also explains Jindal’s criticism toward the government 
when it states,  
“‘Our federal government does not need to be making excuses for BP,’ Jindal said at the 
news conference, only moments before he received word that the White House had 
approved the berm construction. ‘Every day they wait, every day they make us wait, we're 
losing our battle to protect our coast’” (Reuters, June 2, 2010). 
 
Although the sand berm project was passed, it still faces heavily scrutiny for its ability to  
 
provide protection of the coast because it is an expensive project that only provides a  
 
short term fix (while also being able to cause further damage) (The New York Times, June 
26, 2010). Jindal’s use of blame here can describe how if the state is not getting what he 
thinks they deserve then he has resulted to displacing blame upon other parties for the 
further ecological or environmental damage that it is causing.  As I explained earlier, he 
was been active in his go-at it alone approach and working against a unified plan with the 
federal government yet some of his state plans, such as the berm project, require funding 
and support by the federal government. As a figure who has been known to point his 
finger and shift responsibility to the federal government he has demanded a lot from their 
direction. Blaming them for too much help or too little help begins to show a 
contradiction with what he wants as an independent state plan but yet he constantly 
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accuses the government for their slow response to approve of it.  Other state officials 
have also blamed the contractors building the project. An article explains that,  
“State officials are criticizing contractor Shaw Group Inc. and its subcontractors for not 
moving fast enough on the 40-mile berm project. The about $360 million bill is being paid by 
BP PLC, the owner of the well that caused the Gulf oil spill. Shaw and its contractors ‘haven't 
delivered what they promised,’ Garret Graves, chairman of Louisiana's Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority, said in an interview” (DredgingToday, October 12, 2010). 
 
State officials started blaming the subcontractors who were working the project for their 
inability to move fast enough. This constant use of blaming begins to seem like a 
reoccurring theme for the Louisiana State Government. Not only does this hurt their 
reputation but it highlights how they have been displacing blame onto all sorts of parties 
for their inability to properly measure up to the standards that the state has set. The state 
seems to be relying on others because they continually blame these groups for not getting 
the job done or being too slow.  
All of these groups should be working in correspondence with each other because 
they hold responsibility over protecting the people and providing them safety in the event 
of a crisis.  Not only does the media focuses on these disputes over blame and the shifting 
of responsibility but the parties involved in blame itself begin to take part in further 
arguments.  The continuation of disputes can illuminate how those are retaliating to 
scrutiny they had previously received. These arguments may be a device to shift attention 
off of ones own back and onto someone else’s. The focus on these discourses of 
responsibility rather then on the actual relief efforts themselves can begin to alienate an 
individual’s ability to obtain or maintain rights, e.g. legal rights and the right to be 
protected within a disaster.   
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Federal Government:  
 The federal government is responsibility for providing protection and safety for 
the residents in Louisiana in the days, months and years following the oil spill.  Although 
BP was the responsible party for causing the spill, the federal government has authority 
to provide relief through declaring different agencies or departments to deploy assistance 
or resources.  The federal government has been blamed for their lack of urgency and 
response in the days following the spill.  Throughout different points in the debate, the 
national government has often been in opposition to the opinions and perspectives that 
BP has had about the spill.  In particular there was controversy over the estimated flow 
rates that the spill had released into the gulf. BP’s Managing Director Bob Dudley and 
Carol Browner, assistant to the president for energy and climate change, have argued 
over the initial estimates of the spill. In an article it stated that,  
“‘The estimates from the well rates have never been BP estimates,’ Dudley told host John 
Dickerson. ‘They've been through the unified command center. The best way to estimate 
those early rates were from satellite picture.’ But Browner countered by saying that BP's 
interest isn't first and foremost to contain and clean the massive spill. ‘It's important to 
understand that BP has a financial interest in what those flow rates are. They will ultimately 
pay a fine based on those rates,’ she said. When asked if BP lied about initial estimates, she 
said: ‘The very, very first estimates came from BP. They had the footage of the plume. The 
government then did satellite imagery and we realized that those figures were not accurate’” 
(CBS News, May 30, 2010). 
 
 Although these are only two individual figures that represent BP and the national 
government, documenting small cases of comparison between these groups can 
illuminate the overall picture of controversy that exists here. The contention that arose 
from the estimates show how a variation of blaming takes place in the debate.  This 
statement also depicts how BP is questioned to being motivated by financial interest 
rather then the interest of cleaning up the spill and repaying the victims. This is 
significant to understanding the reasons why BP may blame others or shift responsibility 
off of their shoulders in an effort to avoid further economic damages. This is key to 
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understanding what each party’s objective, goal and interpretation of the spill is in terms 
of what consequences or repercussions they fear. In comparison to this the people fear 
future loss and damages as those in authority have tended to focus on how they can 
rebuild their reputation and limit the amount of public scrutiny they face.  In the article a 
CBS News Correspondent further explained that,  
“I do wonder if we're going to see a growing rift between this partnership with the 
administration…Congress and BP because this is the first time I heard BP so strongly say, 
hey, the government's to blame for those bad figures. And the government saying back, of 
course, that BP is to blame for those bad oil flow estimates” (CBS News, May 30, 2010). 
 
The continuation of this blaming between groups harms the unified effort that the nation 
needs to rebuild and restore the gulf region from the oil spill damages.  As the two most 
powerful parties in this debate, BP and the federal government are crucial to providing 
the resources and responses necessary for the victims. Shifting responsibility and blaming 
each other impinges this recovery process and without the coordination of these groups 
then it becomes difficult for officials and administrators to be on the same page about 
providing assistance to the region.  This further complicates things and becomes a 
reoccurring theme throughout the data I have explored. Groups involved in the debate 
have tended to shift their focus toward fighting and making arguments in an on-going 
battle of who is right and who is wrong. This directly depicts why I have found blaming 
so important. It is a critical aspect to how the debate is played out, argued over by 
different groups and how the reciprocation of blaming often becomes a first priority in an 
effort to shift responsibility onto others. 
BP: 
 
Through the public eye and the media there have been detailed accounts of blame 
that has resulted from this debate.  An article described that, “In the aftermath of the 
disaster, there have been numerous efforts to cast blame” (Salon Media Group, May 4, 
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2010).  One of the most contentious groups who has doen this is BP.  As the biggest and 
most noticeable players in the entire debate, BP has been an active and often 
controversial party that not only distributes blame onto other parties but does so in a way 
that tries to focus scrutiny away from themselves.  They began to blame other contractors 
and companies involved with the spill who were working under their jurisdiction.  These 
companies included Transocean and Halliburton.  BP released an internal report 
documenting that the explosion involved a series of failures by a number of companies 
that ultimately led to the spill. In documentation of this report, a news article stated that, 
“the 193-page report deflected attention away from BP and back onto its contractors, 
especially Transocean and Halliburton. While it puts some responsibility on BP for errors 
made — such as misreading pressure data that indicated a blowout was imminent — the 
report tries to undermine the notion that the company acted with gross negligence. Yet 
because of its authorship, it is unlikely to carry much weight in influencing the 
Department of Justice, which is considering criminal and civil charges related to the spill 
(Politico, April 12, 2011). 
 
This statement explains that BP was trying to ‘undermine the notion that the company 
acted with gross negligence’ and that BP was trying to draw attention away from the 
negativity that they have faced.  BP’s report can signify how the abdication of 
responsibility is a key feature to how BP has shifted some of the responsibility off of their 
shoulders and towards other companies involved.  This act of downplaying BP’s role in 
the disastrous spill is important to understand in terms of how other parties are beginning 
to view BP and reciprocate blame back.  Another article described that, 
“BP accepted some responsibility for the disaster but pointed the finger at what it said 
were major failures by Transocean Ltd, the operator of the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig, and oil services company Halliburton, which cemented the deep-sea well that 
ruptured on April 20. The report drew fire from a prominent U.S. lawmaker who accused 
BP of trying to minimize its role in the disaster. Transocean called it a "self-serving" 
attempt by BP to escape responsibility for its "fatally flawed" well design, while 
Halliburton said the report was filled with inaccuracies” (Reuters, September 8, 2010). 
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As both Transocean and Halliburton have admitted they were involved in the spill, they 
also have depicted the extent to which BP was the main contributor to this and has failed 
to take responsibility for their actions.   
 Further on in the report there are other statements that draw attention to how BP 
has been finger pointing at these two companies. The internal report that illustrates what 
failures lead up to the spill and it explained how BP’s failed to take full accountability by 
displacing blame onto others.  Based off this the article stated that,  
“The BP investigation found fault with Transocean employees aboard the rig at the time 
of the accident. ‘Over a 40-minute period, the Transocean rig crew failed to recognize 
and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well,’ BP said. But Transocean said BP 
was seeking to conceal the key factor that led to the rig explosion -- the well design. ‘In 
both its design and construction, BP made a series of cost-saving decisions that increased 
risk,’ it said.Halliburton joined Transocean in rejecting the findings, saying the BP report 
contained ‘substantial omissions and inaccuracies’ and stressed it was fully indemnified 
for any allegations in the document” (Reuters, September 8, 2010). 
 
Not only was BP beginning to blame these companies but the companies attacked BP’s 
report itself.  As one party begins to target another by blaming then it opens up the 
floodgates to a plethora of conflicts, continued blaming and increased retaliation.  This 
not only becomes evident to the parties involved but it also is highly publicized through 
the media.  The article continued to state that,    
“BP, which has seen almost $70 billion wiped off its market value since April 20, is 
trying to rehabilitate its tarnished public image and restore investor confidence, spending 
millions of dollars on positive television and newspaper advertising. 
‘This report is not BP's mea culpa,’ said Democratic congressman Edward Markey, an 
outspoken critic of BP's handling of the disaster. ‘Of their own eight key findings, they 
only explicitly take responsibility for half of one. BP is happy to slice up blame, as long 
as they get the smallest piece’” (Reuters, September 8, 2010). 
 
BP’s acts of blaming displays their need to reinvent and establish their public reputation 
that was severely damaged from the spill.  BP’s shifting of responsibility onto others 
shows how they are taking measures to rebuild their public image as well as recover from 
the negative attention by trying to seem as if they are less guilty. This shifting of 
responsibility is highlighted in news articles where it is debated over by different public 
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officials, politicians and powerful authorities who all have various opinions over these 
acts. This provides us a look into blaming that exists between companies who are 
responsible for the safety measures, public health and the protection of those individuals 
residing in areas where they work.  This depicts that those responsible for the citizens 
pre-spill are also the one’s who should have accountability over the victims post-spill and 
be able to step up to the plate by taking full responsibility without casting blame upon 
others.   
The blaming between these three companies was further documented in May, 
2010 when all three were representing themselves at a hearing in the Senate.  An article 
depicted this and stated that,  
“’Executives of the three companies involved in the Gulf oil disaster — BP, Transocean 
and Halliburton — testified before senators Tuesday and were quick to lay blame 
elsewhere.’ ‘I can see the liability chase that's going to go on,’ Sen. Robert Menendez, D-
N.J., told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee as the hearing got under 
way. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, urged the companies not to point fingers, saying 
that ‘we are all in this together’” (MSNBC, May 11, 2010).  
 
This documents how each company is seeming to work in opposition with each other 
instead of as a coalition united toward providing assistance and restoration to the gulf.  I 
think it is particularly important to notice that the article explained the ‘liability chase’ 
that is going on here. These parties do not want to take full responsibility because they 
will be charged and sued even further then they might have if they try to depict that other 
parties were involved as well. This can be a tactic to avoid further financial losses and 
reputation damages that they could face, yet drawing attention to their continued acts of 
blaming does nothing but work to hurt their reputations within the media. Not only has 
the blaming between these three companies been highly covered in the media but it 
leaves us to question what are they doing to help the victims recover from what they have 
caused.  All these acts of displacing blame and pointing fingers does not do any good for 
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the victims who have been left to deal with the responsibility being displaced upon them.  
The more the media covers about the acts of blaming then the less attention that the 
victims, environment and destroyed livelihoods are getting within the media.  This makes 
us question what relief efforts are actually being done.   
Other blaming from BP also includes their attacks toward the compensation 
process victims for their lack of coordination in resolving the claims and payments. BP 
claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg, has often been severely attacked for the slow 
process and blame that the claims officials have displaced on the public.  An article 
articulates this when it explains,  
“‘We have scores of applications for financial aid that appear to be fraudulent,’ and are 
being reviewed for possible forwarding to the Justice Department for criminal 
investigation, Feinberg said. Some of the suspect claims have obvious discrepancies, 
while others appear to be multiple filings for the same loss, he said. ‘Our resources are 
diverted, and we become skeptical and concerned,’ he added. ‘Fraud always slows the 
process down’” (The Associated Press, October 6, 2010).  
 
Although claims can be fraudulent and not legitimate, the majority of victims who are 
claiming have to wait months, which is often too late, for their compensation payments. 
Angered by this long standing process, victims have often made statements, public 
announcements and voiced other concerns toward BP’s ability to handle the 
compensation process.  The victims, rightfully so, are blaming BP and the claims 
administrators for their lack of organization and claims distribution.   The article also 
depicted this when it described that, "The phones aren't ringing. The e-mails aren't 
coming in," he said. "Where will we be in a year from now? Nobody knows the answer to 
that so how can we accept a final payment?" (The Associated Press, October 6, 2010). 
These victims are not only subject to the compensation fund system but they also become 
integrated into this blame game because they are in dire need to financial compensation.  
The Louisiana resident’s blame BP for their failures that caused the spill and also their 
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allocation of the compensation process which has only alienated victims further away 
from accessing compensation. The blaming that the victims target towards BP is a 
different form of blaming then the type that BP, Transocean and Halliburton take part in. 
The people are innocent and have not caused the destruction and damages but they are 
trying to seek justice and using blame as a tool to do so can work in their favor to grab 
media and public attention toward BP’s controversial compensation process. 
The public and victims have joined this blame game, not for shifting attention 
away from themselves like these companies have done, but actually shifting attention 
toward the continued problems they are facing in acquiring compensation.  In an article 
depicting blame within the oil spill, the writer concludes that “I’d like to join in n the 
blame game that has come to define our national approach to the ongoing environmental 
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico” (The New York Times, June 12, 2010).  The victims who 
are joining in the blame game are actually blaming for the sake of trying to promote 
change or the ability to access these rights.  It was claimed by people within the Gulf that 
“Every day we call the adjuster eight or 10 times.  There’s no answer no answering 
machine,” (said Regina Shipp, who has filed $33,000 in claims for lost business) and that 
“If BP doesn’t pay us within two months, we’ll be out of business” (The Associated 
Press, October 6, 2010). With reasonable cause and frustration, the blaming that the 
people have towards BP’s allocation of money and resources signifies the claiming of 
legal rights and the abdication of responsibility to provide these rights.  Although this 
compensation fund was organized to in fact exercise the legal rights of the victims, it has 
many conditions that limit these rights.  The structure of the eligibility requirements and 
the process in which it is handled often systematically works against these victims and 
begins to exclude individuals based on the outline of the policy.  This use of blaming 
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from the viewpoint of the victims is used as way to ignite power as a group who has 
systematically been denied rights through BP’s handling of its rig and compensation 
process.  It is also a way to further initiate solutions to these issues and target BP as being 
responsibility to provide financial restitution.   
C. Compensation practices: 
 I have described how blaming takes place between different groups involved 
within the disputes of the debate over relief, compensation and recovery plans.  What is 
important to understand is how the relationship between BP’s responsibility to provide 
compensation and the actual distribution of compensation to the victims begins to play 
out throughout the relief process.  These conflicts between the parties involved in the 
compensation process have become one of the most challenged and on going disputes of 
the entire oil spill.  Victims are still dealing with long claims process where they are 
unaware if they are eligible for the claim or even able to receive as much as they claimed.  
With this said I will introduce the fund itself. The BP compensation fund is a $20 billion 
oil spill fund that is administered by Kenneth Feinberg who was appointed by President 
Obama and BP.  Feinberg promised to issue “emergency payments for up to six months 
of lost wages for individuals within 48 hours and half a year of losses to businesses 
within a week” (The Times-Picayune, September 7, 2010).  These payments would soon 
to be found as controversial (as I will mention later).  It was created to provide financial 
repayment toward any damages or losses that occurred directly from the oil spill.  Within 
this section I will explore and analyze three different components of this fund.  They 
include, 1] eligibility requirements, 2] eligibility conditions and 3] the implications of this 
fund.  As one of the most important parts of the debate over citizenship, I think that these 
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sections explain how the legal rights of victims are dictated and allocated in regard to 
how BP is ultimately in charge of who receives what. 
1. Eligibility requirements: 
 There are different eligibility requirements that must be met in order for someone 
to make a claim, be eligible for a claim and actually receive a claim.   The claims process 
involves that individuals and businesses can make a claim against BP through an 
independent claims processor called the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF).  Another 
claims processor is the U.S. Small Business Administration which works in conjunction 
with the GCCF.  Feinberg makes determinations about what claims are eligible.  The 
different eligibility requirements that fall under the claims protocols includes making 
claims over property damage, loss of income/earning capacity, net loss of profits from a 
business, subsistence loss, approved removal and clean-up costs and physical injury or 
death (The Times-Picayune, November 18, 2010).  Some of these requirements are hard 
to determine in accordance to the claims process because some individuals or businesses 
do not have documentation or a way to prove this.  The people experiencing different 
damages have to actually provide accurate and detailed information about their losses.  
This often is difficult and controversial for those victims who have no access to 
documentation which means they can’t provide the essential evidence for their claim to 
be recognized.  Ultimately if BP denies the claim or it goes unsettled for more then 90 
days then the victims can apply for a claim with the National Pollution Fund which is 
handled by the U.S. Coast Guard.  Many people have been waiting months for their 
claims and often this lengthy process has forced them out of their homes, away from their 
businesses and into further debt. 
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Another trivial aspect of the fund was its original designation toward 
compensation based on “geographic proximity as a determining factor for eligibility” as 
well as “the nature of industry and the dependence upon injured natural resources” (The 
New York Times, August 20, 2010).  This structural component of the fund worked 
toward excluding individuals based on geographic locations which did not take into effect 
those who have been indirectly affected.  This would cut our large sectors of business, 
tourism and industries and people who were indirectly but detrimentally impacted by the 
spill.  There was so much debate about this that it was overturned as a requirement for 
making a claim but it is still a determining factor in whether or not a claimant will be 
eligible for receiving compensation. Even though the requirement was overturned, claims 
distributors still admit it is a worthy device to measure and allocate claims to those 
affected where the proximity of the individual or business is taken into account.  This 
process began to determine that BP was not only responsible for what happened to them 
but they would be responsible for what would happen to them.  
 This depicts my argument that even if BP is held accountable for their actions 
and is responsible for the damages, they are still able to be responsible over when and 
how rights are distributed within the claims process.  Victims not only find this unfair and 
unjust but they also feel as if they are being excluded for compensation by the party who 
has placed them in this position and caused them financial damages.  In a news article it 
was documented that, “Legal experts said that the eligibility criteria for oil spill 
settlements, including the emphasis on proximity, make intuitive sense, but they cut out 
large sectors of businesses and people that were indirectly but nonetheless deeply 
affected by the spill” (The Associated Press, October 6, 2010).  Even though geographic 
proximity was eventually found to be an unfair qualification, it is still taken into 
 56
consideration during the claims process.  This can begin to cause consideration debates 
over how BP, as the responsible party for distributing funds, actually is able to further 
alienate individuals from compensation due to their eligibility requirements.  
2. Eligibility conditions: 
 There are different eligibility conditions in the claims process.  These include four 
separate payments options which are 1] emergency advanced payments, 2] quick 
payment option, 3] full review final payments and 4] interim payments.  The emergency 
advanced payments were initial payments for the first several months of the spill.  The 
deadline for this option passed on November 23rd, 2010 (The Times-Picayune, November 
18, 2010).  There was an enormous amount of criticism and complaints over the short 
duration of these claims to be filed, which eventually lead to the creation of interim 
payments (which I will discuss).  Emergency payments stated that someone would apply 
for final or interim payments where upon settling on a payment an individual must waive 
their right to sue BP or any other party involved.  In the beginning of the debate this was 
a crucial part of how individuals were subjected to this system because they found it 
necessary to take these payments to save their homes or businesses.  But over time it was 
evident that they were eligible for more money as their damages grew and other types of 
payments were available.  Other payment options included the quick payment that pays 
5000 within 14 days to individuals and 25000 to businesses within 14 days but they must 
sign release to waive any claims they have now or in the future against any parties 
involved (The New York Times, May 4, 2010).  This creates dilemmas for the people who 
must decide if they should take the money that they need through the claims process (if 
they get approved) or if they should wait for further compensation or litigation which 
could take years.  Since most of these people don’t have time to live without money they 
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have to resort to these quick payments which exclude them from being able to receive 
further payments.  They are trapped within the compensation fund eligibility conditions, 
requirements and practices where they ultimately have no say in what legal rights they 
have or how much money they can or will receive.  This can be important to understand 
how rights become distorted as this environmental disaster has weighed heavily on the 
lives of those who have faced irreparable damages.  The compensation process is 
supposed to allow victims to obtain financial compensation but they find themselves 
unable to do so because BP is not taking full responsibility for compensating these 
victims fully.  Their eligibility requirements, limitations to documenting proof and long 
waiting time periods to receive claims have left them almost rightless.  BP to pay all 
financial damages has not only ignited ongoing disputes but it has been a stark reminder 
at how powerless the victims have become as the recovery process goes on.  In terms of 
citizenship, it is necessary to examine how the relationship between these two groups 
becomes even more polarized as they both are trying to fulfill their own objectives.  This 
includes how victims are trying to receive compensation as BP is trying to make this 
process as fast and exclusionary as possible to push this ongoing public dispute behind 
them. 
 The third payment option is full review final payments which one can apply to if 
eligible where they must again waive their right to sue upon final settlement.  Interim 
payments are a relevantly new development that was created because of the dispute over 
the final payments that trapped individuals into signing off their right to sue.  These 
payments are able to be claimed once each quarter of the calendar year where they do not 
have to release or waive any right while also being able to submit a claim for final 
payment (where you must release your rights).  The provision in the final oil spill 
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settlement protocol requires people to waive their right to sue has been controversial.  
This limits the amount of money someone may receive in the future from impacts that 
have not surfaced and this takes away the right for those to further follow lawsuits against 
these corporations. This can directly show how the practice of citizenship becomes 
disrupted because those who are in fact responsible for the damages also have the power 
to distribute and structure who gets compensation, when they get it and how much they 
get. 
  Three of the four eligibility conditions of the Gulf Coast Claims Fund require that 
those who finalize their payments must release all waives and claims that they have now 
or in the future against those parties responsible (The New York Times, August 20, 2010).  
This directly limits the rights toward future compensation of unknown damages and has 
often convinced victims to sign final payments because they are in dire need of finances 
(save their home or business).  This does not allow them to fully assess the long term 
impacts.  This not only inhibits and subjects these victims into a system that works 
against their benefit but it actually is organized to limit the rights these people have in the 
wake of disaster, instead of providing these rights. BP has shown a lack of decisiveness 
for organizing a format that is more equal in distributing financial restitution.  I think it is 
important to see how these administers have complained and targeted victims for making 
this process harder while those who are awaiting their payments have been questioning 
what is actually being done, or more precisely, ‘where is our money’.  The long process 
of suing these companies would create years of litigation and processing in drawn-out 
lawsuits, so they are often are pushed into the direction of claiming final payments and 
interim payments (The New York Times, August 20, 2010). 
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C. Compensation Fund Implications: 
Understanding that not all people are able to practice rights show that the 
compensation fund is based off the idea that those who are eligible for legal re-
compensation will have a better chance at receiving it but the initial formation of this 
process reveals that not all victims can in fact access these rights, i.e. the fund would not 
be structured through eligibility requirements or conditions if the creators had planned to 
exclude individuals.  The compensation process has generated media attention towards 
the continued disputes over the failure of the claims administrators to distribute funds 
timely and consistently.  Much scrutiny has faced Kenneth Feinberg and the claims 
processors who have not been able to keep up with the flood of recent claims that piled 
up due to the introduction of the interim payment option.  My analysis over this particular 
sphere of the debate allowed me to determine how the compensation eligibility 
requirements and conditions have become a legalized form of exclusion.  This has surged 
public disputes over how this process has been unequal, unfair and an unorganized failure 
in financially compensation victims.  The structure of this fund has systematically 
restricted individuals based on lack of proof, documentation, geographic proximity and 
has required those to waive their right to sue once accepting a final settlement.  They not 
only document how BP’s compensation fund unevenly distributes funds but how they use 
these requirements to selectively exclude victims based on the outlines of the fund (The 
Associated Press, April 20, 2011).  This important concept further supports my analysis 
over how these legal rights are being claimed or obtained through the processes that BP 
has established.  As the party responsible, BP ultimately is restricting all disaster-victims 
and therefore not making justice or compensation fully accessible to all individuals or 
businesses.   
 60
 There are other trivial aspects to the distribution of the fund and the way it has 
exacerbated the effects of the oil spill even farther, in terms of emotional, economic and 
social stress on the victims awaiting their claim approval or payments.  A recent 
controversy arose when it went public that the claims processors received a raise. It was 
stated that, 
“Gulf Coast Claims Facility administrator Ken Feinberg has been perhaps the most hated 
man along the Gulf Coast. Now that Feinberg and his law firm will receive a 400-
thousand dollar a month raise, oil spill victims like Orange Beach restaurant owner Jeff 
Price, who's still waiting on a claims check, says Feinberg won't win any popularity 
contests anytime soon” (The Associated Press, October 6, 2010). 
 
This not only shows that those responsible for the damages inflicted upon Louisianans 
are actually receiving benefits but that they control the power over how these legal rights 
can be accessible or inaccesible, depending on if someones claim passes.  This does not 
ensure that the individual or business will even receive the amount of money they have 
claimed and it could take months for these claims to be filed, while those who rely on this 
money don’t have time.  Other victims include, “Fishing guide Mike Garey, who got just 
$21,000 in response to his request for $70,000 in losses, isn't sure what he'll do” who is 
disappointed and does not know where to turn after waiting months for a small claim 
(Huffington Post, October 4, 2010). Other people simple don’t have the time to wait 
around for this money.  This concept was depicted within an article about the impacts of 
the fund. 
"The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill has disrupted the lives of thousands upon thousands of 
individuals, often cutting off the income on which they depend," the department said in a 
Sept. 17 letter to Feinberg. "Many of these individuals and businesses simply do not have 
the resources to get by while they await processing” (Huffington Post, October 4, 2010). 
 
This has been the case for many struggling individuals in Louisiana.  These victims have 
suffered enough and the lack of organization for claims to be filed for repayment has 
taken a toll on their livelihoods and their ability to recover in this process.  Some have 
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said that, "The phones aren't ringing. The e-mails aren't coming in," he said. "Where will 
we be in a year from now? Nobody knows the answer to that so how can we accept a 
final payment?" (The Associated Press, October 6, 2010).  As the party responsible for 
compensation for financial damages and losses, BP and the compensation fund have 
failed to live up to the expectations of the victims.  BP has even shot back at the 
complaints about the process and have justified reasons for this, instead of moving 
forward in the distribute the claims.  Skoloff again depicts this in his article by describing 
that, “Feinberg, however, said many of the claims are simply too flawed to pay out. ‘We 
have thousands of claims where there is no documentation, none,’ he said (The 
Associated Press, October 6, 2010).  They address how no documentation has been the 
cause and that “claims are simply too flawed to pay out” and there is over 39,000 claims 
that need additional documentation so they remain on hold (The Associated Press, 
October 6, 2010). These excuses from BP do not provide reassurance to the victims but it 
actually brings further stress to their already struggling financial troubles.  
These excuses have only depiected how BP and the claims process has created 
conflicts and disputes between these two groups.  As BP does this they are shifting 
responsibility off of themselves and onto the compliants for their lack of proof and 
documentation which have led to a further chaotic claims process. As BP is under enough 
scrutiny and public controversy from the oil spill and the compensation process itself, it 
is not surprise that they are shifting responsibility onto the shoulders of the publc in an 
effort to portray themselves as being productive and efficent in this process compared to 
how they say the victims are making the situation worse (The Associated Press, October 
6, 2010).  This shows how the claiming of rights becomes a difficult as those responsible 
for providing a timely and consistent claims process actually fail to due so. This can 
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highlight how the disputes between these groups becomes more prevalent within this 
aspect of the debate in regard to how rights and responsibilities are handled by the 
authority.   
VI. Conclusion: 
 Louisiana is home to a historical environment that has been plagued by disaster 
and has been the center of debates over how victims are treated in the wake of crises.  
The debate of the oil spill must be thought about in relation to Hurricane Katrina because 
it caused a dramatic reconsideration of citizenship within both academia and the public.  
The current debate follows similar footsteps to what was argued over and presented 
through the media. The oil spill caused victims, the public and the media to begin to talk 
about rights, blaming, accountability and responsibility.  These concepts are important in 
understanding how different groups begin to form opinions and perspectives over these 
issues in the debate. This leads to parties involved discussing who is wrong, who 
committed wrongdoing and what must be done to make it right.  This can highlight how 
this disaster created animosity between those who caused it and those who experienced it. 
These groups disputed over who was to blame, what relief efforts were made, how 
compensation would be rationed, how those responsible would be handled and what were 
steps taken that failed.  The theme present in these disputes is how the victims of the spill 
would be accounted for and who would be responsible for what actions would be taken, 
i.e. how the accessibility of rights to safety, protection, compensation and aid would be 
attained.   
The way I used citizenship to emphasize and explore each of the three sections in 
my analysis allowed me to ground my work around this concept to where I could 
compare the discussions between different groups that become evident in the debate.  I 
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used the notion of citizenship to unpack issues that are embedded into the debate and 
address concepts that I found particularly crucial to examine. These concepts are 
foundational to how I have analyzed the 1] way the debate was framed, 2] the variation of 
blaming and 3] the compensation fund.   Through these sections I was able to decipher 
three important themes that arise through the framework of citizenship.   
The first theme is how responsibilities are transferred onto the public.  This theme 
in the debate has not only been a way to think of the response efforts but how the lack of 
urgency in these efforts was an example of how responsibility has been shifted onto the 
shoulders of the victims.  The differing attitudes and actions by BP and the local and 
national government lead to discrepancies over the urgent actions taken toward providing 
aid or assistance.  The second important theme that the framing of citizenship allows me 
to examine is how the victims of this disaster become alienated and excluded in the 
debate. Those that become focused on the abdication of responsibility are often doing so 
in the discussion over how the victims should be compensated and what relief efforts 
should be made.  As more focus is placed on who isn’t doing what and what should be 
done, then the discussions over these issues become even more distant from being 
attained. As the spill progressed throughout the media, we saw a quiet push of attention 
away from the stories, experiences and impacts that these people have faced. The third 
theme is how the Louisiana people have faced further difficulties in acquiring legal rights 
through the process of the compensation fund.  The fund was established by BP to repay 
financial damages to victims because they had an obligation to this responsibility. This 
has surged public disputes over how this process has been unequal, unfair and an 
unorganized failure in financially compensating those who have been damaged.  The 
structure of this fund restricted individuals based on lack of proof, documentation, 
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geographic proximity and has required those to waive their right to sue once accepting a 
final settlement.  
 With the multitude of disputes, controversies and diverse opinions over the 
implications of the spill, the use of citizenship can provide a way to easier talk about the 
public response to the disaster.  My work on the topic of citizenship in the context of 
environmental disaster can begin to open up discussions over what policies could be 
implemented in preventing future destruction and oil spill disaster plans. This topic is 
important because it can lead to policy changes or laws that work to not only protect the 
environmental but also peoples ability to exercise their legal or social rights in the wake 
of disaster.  Policy changes within the human rights and energy policy areas must be 
addressed and brought to the public’s attention in order to bring about changes to prevent 
disasters.  It takes disasters like this to restructure how our government handles disasters, 
human rights issues, compensation processes, drilling regulations and future energy 
policy changes. My project can begin to draw insight into an issue that has been 
controversial but yet crucial in understanding what social, economic and political 
implications that environmental hazards can have on a region. 
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